This paper analyzes the equilibrium level of private credit to GDP in 11 Central and Eastern European countries in order to see whether the high credit growth recently observed in some of these countries led to above equilibrium private creditto-GDP levels. We use estimation results obtained for a panel of small open OECD economies (out-of-sample sample) to derive the equilibrium credit level for a panel of transition economies (in-sample panel). We opt for this (out-of-sample) approach because the coef cient estimates for transition economies are fairly unstable. We show that there is a large amount of uncertainty to determine the equilibrium level of private credit. Yet our results indicate that a number of countries are very close or even above the estimated equilibrium levels, whereas others are still well below the equilibrium level.
Introduction
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews some stylized facts regarding credit growth in the transition economies. Section 3 brie y overviews the relevant literature, sketches the issue of initial undershooting and overshooting of the credit-to-GDP ratio, and examines their consequences for econometric testing. Section 4 presents the economic speci cation used for the estimations and describes the dataset and the estimation techniques. Section 5 then presents and discusses the estimation results. Finally, Section 6 draws some concluding remarks.
Some Stylized Facts
To place credit developments in transition economies into context, it is useful to recall that nancial systems in these countries are bank-based -about 85% of nancial sector assets are bank assets -and that capital markets (in particular corporate bond and stock market segments) are generally not very developed. This implies that bank credit is the main source of external nancing in these countries, although foreign direct investment (FDI) has also been important in some countries.
Banking sectors in transition economies in CEE have undergone a comprehensive transformation in the past 15 years or so, including wide-ranging reforms of their regulatory frameworks and supervisory arrangements, bank consolidation schemes and -in almost all countries -sweeping privatization of nancial institutions, mainly to foreign strategic owners (mostly nancial institutions based in "old" EU Member States). Consequently, the governance of banks has greatly improved, and the performance and health of these banking sectors have advanced substantially, as standard prudential indicators show. 4 In 2005, the banking systems' capital adequacy ratios in the 11 countries ranged from 10.6% (Slovenia) to 20.3% (Romania), with an unweighted average of about 13%, well above the statutory minimum of 8% prescribed by the Basel rules. Pro tability has risen considerably, as return on equity data show, and is now above the EU average (about 13%) in most countries covered in this study (see Chart 1). Asset quality has improved, as non-performing loan ratios have fallen (see Chart 1). Reserves and provisions now cover a considerable part of substandard assets in most of the countries under review here, as coverage ratios ranged from 60% to 100% in 2005 in most cases, with an unweighted average of about 85%.
Chart 1. Return on Equity and Nonperforming Loans
Return on Equity with low credit-to-GDP ratios of around 20%. Estonia and Latvia then recorded a marked increase in the ratio, and the credit-to-GDP ratio also rose steadily in Slovenia from the early 1990s to 2004 although the overall increase was less pronounced than in the two aforementioned Baltic countries. Credit growth has picked up only recently in Lithuania and Romania, and for Poland, only a moderate increase can be observed during the second half of the period studied.
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Romania (15%) and Hungary (44%) are outliers in this respect. It should be noted, however, that a low coverage ratio is not necessarily problematic, as it can to some extent re ect the classi cation and composition of non-performing assets. Moreover, a high level of capitalization may provide an alternative cushion if the coverage ratio of reserves and provisions is low.
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Chart 2. Bank Credit to the Private Sector as a Percentage of GDP, 1990 GDP, to 2004 Baltic Countries Estonia   0%   20%   40%   60%   80%   1990q1  1991q1  1992q1  1993q1  1994q1  1995q1  1996q1  1997q1  1998q1  1999q1  2000q1  2001q1  2002q1  2003q1  2004q1   Latvia   0%   20%   40%   60%   80%   1990q1  1991q1  1992q1  1993q1  1994q1  1995q1  1996q1  1997q1  1998q1  1999q1  2000q1  2001q1  2002q1  2003q1  2004q1   Lithuania   0%   20%   40%   60%   80%   1990q1  1991q1  1992q1  1993q1  1994q1  1995q1  1996q1  1997q1  1998q1  1999q1  2000q1  2001q1  2002q1  2003q1  2004q1 Central and Eastern Europe -5 80%   1990q1  1991q1  1992q1  1993q1  1994q1  1995q1  1996q1  1997q1  1998q1  1999q1  2000q1  2001q1  2002q1  2003q1  2004q1   Slovenia   0%   20%   40%   60%   80%   1990q1  1991q1  1992q1  1993q1  1994q1  1995q1  1996q1  1997q1  1998q1  1999q1  2000q1  2001q1  2002q1  2003q1  2004q1 South Eastern Europe Bulgaria   -10%   10%   30%   50%   70%   90%   1990q1  1991q1  1992q1  1993q1  1994q1  1995q1  1996q1  1997q1  1998q1  1999q1  2000q1  2001q1  2002q1  2003q1  2004q1   Croatia   0%   20%   40%   60%   80%   1990q1  1991q1  1992q1  1993q1  1994q1  1995q1  1996q1  1997q1  1998q1  1999q1  2000q1  2001q1  2002q1  2003q1  2004q1   Romania   -10%   10%   30%   50%   70%   90%   1990q1  1991q1  1992q1  1993q1  1994q1  1995q1  1996q1  1997q1  1998q1  1999q1  2000q1  2001q1  2002q1  2003q1  2004q1 Source: Authors' calculations based on data drawn from the IFS/IMF. For precise data de nitions, see Section 4.2.
By contrast, the second group of countries, notably Croatia and Hungary, started transition with higher credit-to-GDP ratios than the Baltic countries. After dropping considerably to close to 20%, the ratio started to increase, reaching pretransition levels in Hungary and growing to levels well exceeding 40% in Croatia by 2004.
The third group of countries, comprising Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, had the 5 highest credit-to-GDP ratio at the beginning of the period (between 60% and 80%). For Bulgaria, this ratio came down to 10% in 1997, while expanding to close to 40% by 2004. 6 The Czech
Republic and Slovakia also recorded a substantial contraction (to nearly 30% for both countries), while the ratios seem to have stabilized during the last couple of years.
The differences in initial credit-to-GDP levels can be traced largely to different approaches with respect to the nancing of (credit to) enterprises under central planning across countries as well as strongly diverging in ation (price level adjustment) patterns across countries at the initial stage of transition. In turn, major temporary contractions in credit-to-GDP ratios during the transition process have mainly been due to banking consolidation measures, by which nonperforming assets were removed from banks' balance sheets. Such nonperforming assets (mostly loans) had either been inherited from the previous era of central planning or were built up in the early transition years, when banking systems were still immature, awed by inadequate regulation, connected lending and simple lack of experience.
3 The Equilibrium Level of Private Credit
Literature Overview
Several theoretical and empirical studies have dealt with credit growth, nancial deepening and lending booms. One body of literature on credit growth reviews the determinants of credit demand and credit supply. In the models on credit demand, real GDP, prices and interest rates are commonly the explanatory variables, although there is no "standard" model is widely used. On the supply side, a variety of credit channel models consider how changes in the nancial positions of banks (bank lending channel) and borrowers (balance sheet channel) affect the availability of credit in an
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Note that the peculiar and rather fuzzy pattern of the credit-to-GDP ratio in Bulgaria shown in chart 1 is not due to data problems but, to a considerable extent, driven by exchange rate movements. The ratio rose sharply in 1994, 1996 and 1997 because of the depreciation of the domestic currency vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, considering that a signi cant share of credit was denominated in foreign currency (mainly U.S. dollars). Correction of the credit ratio occurred in the post-crisis period because of the appreciation of the domestic currency and because of the write-off of nonperforming loans. 6 economy (see Hall, 2001 , for a succinct overview). However, modeling and estimation techniques in this area are complicated due to dif culties in separating demand-side effects from supply-side effects (see e.g. Rajan 1994 ).
Regarding the relationship between credit and growth, there are strong empirical indications of a positive interaction between the two, usually with elasticity higher than one in the long run.
This implies that credit-to-GDP levels rise as per capita GDP increases, a process which is denoted as nancial deepening (see Terrones and Mendoza, 2004 for a concise overview). In addition, empirical studies have examined the direction of causality; with most results suggesting that it is nancial deepening which spurs economic development (see e.g. Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000, and Rajan and Zingales, 2001 for an overview). While the results of this literature are appealing, it is dif cult to establish genuine causality, while nonlinearities in the relationship between nancial development and growth as well as country heterogeneity add to the problems of empirical analysis in this area (see discussion in Favara, 2003) .
The literature on lending booms has identi ed four main triggers: (i) real business cycles caused by technological or terms-of-trade shocks (with highly pro-cyclical output elasticity of credit demand), (ii) nancial liberalization of an initially repressed nancial system, (iii) capital in ows triggered by external factors, and (iv) wealth shocks originating from comprehensive structural reforms (see Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche (2001) for a survey). In addition, less than fully credible policies (in particular exchange rate-based stabilizations) can also play a role in spurring credit booms, by setting off an unsustainable consumption boom (see Calvo and Vegh (1999) for a review). Moreover, the nancial acceleration literature, including the more recent literature on credit cycles, gives some theoretical insights into the mechanisms that drive or amplify credit expansions, which turn out to be non-sustainable and thus ultimately require a correction (Terrones and Mendoza, 2004) . There is little evidence in the empirical literature that lending booms typically lead to nancial crises. As Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche. (2001) point out, while the conditional probability of a lending boom occurring before a nancial crisis may be quite high, this does not tell us much about the converse, i.e. the conditional probability that a nancial crisis will follow a lending boom. 
Initial Under-and Overshooting in Transition Economies
The question of whether or not credit growth in transition economies is excessive is closely related to the issue of what the equilibrium level of the stock of bank credit to the private sector as a share of GDP in those countries is. In this study, we de ne the equilibrium level of private credit as the level of private credit, which would be justi ed by the economic fundamentals. Deviations from the equilibrium level occur if changes in the private credit-to-GDP ratio cannot be explained by changes in the economic fundamentals (so-called undershooting and overshooting). Hence, our notion of equilibrium is very close to the one used for instance in the literature on equilibrium exchange rates (Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate -BEER) and in other elds of the economic profession.
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Chart 3 demonstrate when moving from point A through B to C, the level of private credit increases as a function of the underlying fundamentals. The depicted trajectory of the increase in the credit-to-GDP ratio (credit growth) can be thought of as an equilibrium phenomenon.
However, we may also think of a situation when the observed credit-to-GDP ratio is out of tune with economic fundamentals. For example, Point A' depicts the situation when the initial credit-to-GDP ratio is higher than what the level of economic development would justify (initial overshooting), whereas Point A" shows where this ratio is lower (initial undershooting). In these cases, credit growth should differ from the equilibrium rate of growth, and this would secure the
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The nancial accelerator literature, including the more recent literature on credit cycles, gives some theoretical insights into the mechanisms that drive or amplify credit expansions, which later on turn out to be non-sustainable and thus ultimately require a correction. Overshooting, to give just one example, may occur if bank managers follow overly loose credit policies in order to boost current bank earnings at the expense of future earnings. Moreover, as information externalities make banks' credit policies interdependent, banks coordinate and tighten credit policy in the event of an adverse shock to borrowers (Rajan, 1994). return to the equilibrium level of the credit-to-GDP ratio.
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Initial undershooting (Point A") may be important for transition economies, most of which started their economic transformation process with lower levels of credit-to-GDP ratios than other countries at the same level of development would have in other parts of the world. This is the heritage of central planning as under the Communist regimes the nancial sector was underdeveloped. Hence, once economic transformation from central planning to market is completed, higher credit growth in the transition economies may partly re ect the correction from this initial undershooting to the equilibrium level of the credit-to-GDP ratio. This is shown in Chart 3, where the move from A" to B can be decomposed into (a) equilibrium credit growth, given by A" to B", and (b) the adjustment from initial undershooting to equilibrium (from B" to B). However, in cases of high credit growth rates, the increase in credit to GDP may be even higher than justi ed by the equilibrium change and the correction from the initial undershooting. The move from A" to B' on Chart 3 indicates such an overshooting, where the excessive increase in credit to GDP is given by the distance between B and B'.
The Consequences of an Initial Under-or Overshooting
If there is initial undershooting or overshooting at the beginning of the transition process and if the adjustment toward equilibrium occurs gradually (implying persistent initial undershooting or overshooting), the use of panels that only include transition economies may lead to severely biased constant terms and coef cient estimates, as put forward in the context of equilibrium exchange rates by Maeso-Fernandez, Osbat and Schnatz (2005) . When regressing the observed credit-to-GDP ratio moving from A" to B (instead of the equilibrium change from A to B) on a set of fundamentals, the slope coef cient would suffer from an obvious upward bias. By the same token, the constant term will be lower than it would be in the absence of an initial undershooting.
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In both cases, credit growth is expressed in terms of GDP. For example, credit growth ([C(t)-C(t-1)]/C(t-1) is higher for countries with lower credit-to-GDP levels than for countries with higher credit-to-GDP levels if both countries have similar credit-to-GDP ows. Hence, it is more appropriate to relate changes in credit to the GDP to avoid this distortion (Arpa, Reininger and Walko, 2005) , as we do in this study. This is why it is advisable to use panels including countries which do not exhibit an initial undershooting or overshooting in the credit-to-GDP ratio or to use out-of-sample panels for the analysis of the equilibrium level of the credit-to-GDP ratio of transition economies. Cottarelli, Dell'Ariccia and Vladkova-Hollar (2005) were the rst to estimate a model of the longterm relationship between the private sector credit/GDP ratio and a set of variables (see table 1) for a panel of non-transition economies. Subsequently, they produce out-of-sample estimates for private sector credit/GDP ratios of 15 CEE countries. As actual private sector credit-to-GDP levels were considerably lower in 2002 than the authors' estimates of the expected long-term credit/GDP ratios they conclude that private-sector bank credit levels in that year were not inconsistent with the structural characteristics of the economies under examination.
The Empirical Literature on Transition Economies
We are aware of two other recent studies, which also investigate the equilibrium level of private credit and the possible "excessiveness" of credit growth in transition economies. Boissay, CalvoGonzalez and Kozluk (2006) rst estimate time series models including GDP-per-capita and real interest rates for a number of established market economies for periods with stable credit-to-GDP ratios. They then compare the average of the credit growth rates for transition economies obtained using the error correction speci cations estimated for the developed countries with the observed credit growth in the transition economies. They also estimate time series models for transition economies, which include the real interest rate, a quadratic trend and a dummy aimed at capturing changes in credit growth after 2001. Their results indicate excessive credit growth in the three Baltic States and in Bulgaria and to a lesser extent also in Hungary and Croatia. At the same time, credit growth in Romania and Slovenia seems to be non-excessive.
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The study by Kiss, Nagy and Vonnák (2006) 
estimates a dynamic panel (Pooled Mean Group
Estimator) model including GDP-per-capita, real interest rate and in ation of 11 euro area countries (excluding Luxembourg) to generate out-of-sample estimates for private sector credit-to-GDP ratios of the three Baltic countries and of the CEE-5 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). They nd that only Estonia and Latvia may have come close recently to equilibrium while the other countries have credit-to-GDP ratios below the estimated equilibrium levels. Besides being above the estimated equilibrium credit level, they de ne two other criteria which may indicate a credit boom: (a) if the observed credit growth exceeds the one implied by the long-run equilibrium relationship and (b) if the observed growth rate is higher than the speed of adjustment to equilibrium in the error-correction model. Overall, they nd that the risk of a credit boom is high
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Two observations come to mind with regard to this paper. First, the quadratic trend may capture missing variables from their model (which indeed only contains real interest rates) and explosive trends due to credit boom or to adjustment from initial undershooting of credit levels. It is in fact surprising to see that a sizeable number of countries have excessive credit growth given that the quadratic trend has a very good t thus leaving very little unexplained variation in the credit series. Second, the authors use Euribor for their only macroeconomic variable, the real interest rate. This may be problematic because some foreign currency denominated loans are linked to other currencies than the euro for instance in Hungary but also because Euribor neglects the country risk and default risk at the micro level.
in both Estonia and Latvia according to these criteria, whereas Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia might be in the danger zone because the observed growth rates are higher than the one derived from the long-run equilibrium relationship. In addition, they argue that possible credit booms are mainly due to credit expansion to households and not to the non nancial corporate sector.
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We contribute to this literature by expanding the list of countries (11 transition, OECD and emerging market economies), the list of explanatory variables, by constructing carefully several possible benchmark country groups which share common characteristics with the transition economies (emerging markets, small emerging markets, small and open OECD countries) and by performing extensive sensitivity analysis of the estimation results.
Economic and Econometric Speci cations 4.1 The Empirical Model
Most studies investigating credit growth employ a simple set of explanatory variables (see Table   1 ), which usually includes GDP per capita or real GDP, some kind of (real or nominal) interest rate and the in ation rate (Calza et al., 2001 (Calza et al., , 2003 Brzoza-Brzezina, 2005; Boissay, Calvo-Gonzalez and Kozluk, 2006 and Kiss, Nagy and Vonnák, 2006) . Hofmann (2001) extends this list by house prices, a very important variable, because a rise in house prices is usually accompanied by an increase in credit to the private sector. Cottarelli et al. (2005) use indicators capturing factors that drive the private credit-to-GDP ratio.
These variables describe the degree of nancial liberalization, the quality and implementation of accounting standards, entry restrictions to the banking sector and the origin of the legal system. Finally, they use a measure of public debt aimed at analyzing possible crowding-out (or crowdingin) effects.
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It may be noted that the two additional criteria used by the authors have some drawbacks. First, the observed growth rates may be in excess of the one derived from the long-run equilibrium relationship because of the adjustment from initial undershooting. Second, the speed of adjustment to equilibrium differs if the actual observations are below or above the estimated equilibrium. Kiss et al. (2006) Credit to the private sector (%GDP)
GDP per capita, real interest rate in ation rate Note: GDP per capita in PPS (purchasing power standards) is obtained by converting GDP per capita gures using the nominal exchange rate given by the domestic and foreign price levels (P/P*).
The economic speci cation which we estimate for the private credit-to-GDP ratio relies on explanatory variables used in previous studies, but also extends them. We consider the following variables:
1.) GDP per capita in terms of purchasing power standards (PPS) (CAP IT A ). An increase in per capita GDP is expected to result in an increase in credit to the private sector. Alternatively, we also use real GDP (gdpr ) and industrial production (ip ) to check for the robustness of the GDP per capita variable and to see to what extent these variables, which are used interchangeably in the literature, are substitutes.
2.)
Bank credit to the government sector as a percentage of GDP (C G ). As this variable captures possible crowding-out effects, any increase (decrease) in bank credit to the government sector is thought to give rise to a decrease (increase) in bank credit to the private sector. It should be noted that bank credit to the government measures crowding out better than public debt as employed in Cottarelli et al. (2005) , because public debt also includes loans taken out abroad and because public entities may well nance themselves on the securities markets. Moreover, public debt is subject to valuation and stock-ow adjustments.
3.) Short-term and long-term nominal lending interest rates (i ). Lower interest rates should promote credit to the private sector, implying a negative sign for this variable. Calza et al. (2001) use both short-term and long-term interest rates, arguing that whether either rates play a more important role depends on the respective share of loans with xed interest rates and variable interest rates. Because the nominal lending interest rates used in the paper show a high correlation with short-term interest rates (three-month Treasury bills and money market rates), short-term interest rates are used as a robustness check rather than as an additional variable.
4.)
In ation (p ). High in ation is thought to be associated with a drop in bank credit to the private sector. In ation is measured both in terms of the producer price index (PPI) and the consumer price index (CPI).
5.)
House prices (p house ). There are a number of reasons why changes in housing prices might lead to changes in credit demand. First, increases in housing prices result in a rise in the total amount which has to be spent to purchase a given residential or commercial property. This is subsequently re ected in an increase in demand for credit through which the higher purchasing price can be fully or partly nanced. This means that an increase in housing prices may generate more credit to the private sector. Second, rising housing prices may generate a rise in credit demand of homeowners as higher housing prices increase lifetime wealth according to Modigliani's lifecycle theory, which in turn leads to consumption smoothing by means of more borrowing. By contrast, higher housing prices are usually connected to higher rents, which decrease borrowing of renters (Hofmann, 2001) . Third, credit demand may be affected by housing prices because Tobin's q theory is also applicable to the housing market. For example, a higher-than-unity q implies market value above replacement cost, and this promotes construction production, which is re ected in higher demand for loans. Changes in commercial and residential property prices also have an in uence on credit supply. According to the broad lending channel, net wealth, serving as collateral for credit, determine the capacity of rms and household to borrow externally. Put differently, higher housing prices resulting in rising net wealth increase the amount of credit provided by banks. Overall, both credit supply and demand bear a positive relationship to housing prices from a theoretical viewpoint.
However, a fundamental problem arising here is whether price increases in the real estate market are driven by fundamental factors or whether they re ect a bubble. If price developments in the real estate market mirror changes in fundamentals, such as the quality of housing or adjustments to the underlying fundamentals, the ensuing rise in the stock of credit can be viewed as an equilibrium phenomenon. In contrast, in the event that high credit growth is due to the development of a housing price bubble due to speculation, the accompanying credit growth is a disequilibrium phenomenon from the point of view of long-term credit stock.
6.)
The degree of liberalization of the nancial sector, in particular that of the banking sector. A higher degree of nancial liberalization makes it easier for banks to fund credit supply.
Because the nancial liberalization indices (f inlib ) used in Abiad and Mody (2003) and Cottarelli et al. (2005) only partially match our country and time coverage, we use in addition the spread between lending and deposit rates to capture nancial liberalization. A decrease in the spread can be an indication of nancial liberalization in particular if it re ects more intensive competition among banks and also between banks and other nancial intermediaries. It should be noted, however, that the spread variables could also capture other factors than nancial liberalization. 12 With this caveat and limitation in mind, spread variables are still the most appropriate variables to capture nancial liberalization that are available for all the countries in the different panels covered in this study.
7.) Public and private credit registries ( reg). The existence of credit registries diminishes problems related to asymmetric information and the probability of credit fraud. This in turn leads
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Note e.g. that the recent decline in the absolute level of spreads may be partly due to record low global interest rates.
15
to an increase in the supply of bank credit, all things being equal.
1314
For some of the variables, it is notoriously dif cult to separate whether they in uence the demand for or the supply of credit. For instance, GDP per capita and the interest rate variables could affect both credit demand and supply. These problems were tackled in the literature on the credit channel by the use of bank-and rm-level data. 15 However, given that we are interested in aggregated macroeconomic variables, these identi cation issues are beyond the scope of this paper.
Our baseline speci cation includes per capita GDP, bank credit to the public sector, nominal lending rates, in ation rates and nancial liberalization based on the spread:
where C P is bank credit to the private sector expressed as a share of GDP. In addition, it is worthwhile checking whether the robustness of the variables included in equation (1) is affected by the use of alternative measures often used in the literature (e.g. replacing GDP per capita by real GDP growth and real industrial production, or long-term lending rates by short-term lending rates, and the PPI by the CPI). These alternative variables are subsequently introduced one by one in the baseline speci cation, which yields ve additional equations.
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In contrast to Cottarelli et al. (2005) , for econometric reasons, we do not include a variable that captures the tradition of legal systems of countries, which can affect nancial development. The mean group estimator (MGE) estimation methods in section 5 do not allow the use of dummy variables that take a value of zero throughout the entire period.
14 We are aware of the fact that the registry variable may not capture how credit contracts are enforced in courts. However, even though an easier seizure of collateral by banks may spark credit to households and small rms, such growth will probably be re ected in a one-off spike in growth rates.
The sensitivity check to the alternative speci cation is then followed by the use of the registry variable and by the inclusion of house prices:
Estimation Methods
The rst step is to check whether our series are stationary in levels. Hadri test tests the null of no unit root against the alternative of a unit root, whereas the remaining tests take the null of a unit root against the alternative of no unit root.
If the series turn out to be nonstationary in levels but stationary in rst differences, the coefcients of the long-term relationships for the relationships shown in equations (1) to (9) are derived using three alternative estimation techniques: a.) xed-effect ordinary least squares (FE_OLS); b.) panel dynamic OLS estimates (DOLS) and c.) the mean group estimator (MGE) proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) .
The panel dynamic OLS, which is the mean group of individual DOLS estimates, accounts for the endogeneity of the regressors and serial correlation in the residuals in the simple OLS setting by incorporating leads and lags of the regressors in rst differences. The panel DOLS can be written for panel member as follows:
where k i;1 and k i;2 denote respectively leads and lags and the cointegrating vector 0 contains the long-term coef cients of the explanatory variables (with h = 1; ::; n ) for each panel member i.
The mean group estimator (MGE) is based on the error correction form of the ARDL model, which is given for panel member i as shown in equation (10) where the dependent variable in rst differences is regressed on the lagged values of the dependent and independent variables in levels and rst differences:
where l i;1 and l i;2 are the maximum lags. The long-term coef cients ( 0 ) are obtained by normalizing vector 0 on .
Finally, we use the error correction term ( ) obtained from the error-correction speci cation of the mean group estimator as tests for cointegration. A negative and statistically signi cant error correction term is taken as evidence for the presence of cointegration.
Results

Estimation Results
The estimations are carried out for quarterly data covering 43 countries, which are grouped into three main panels: (a) developed OECD countries, (b) emerging markets from Asia and the Amer- Panel unit root tests are employed for level data and for rst-differenced data. While the test results show that most of the series are I(1) processes, in some cases, the tests yield con icting results for level data. However, since the tests do not indicate unambiguously in any case that the series are stationary in level, we conclude that they are I(1).
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When analyzing possible long-term relationships between the private credit-to-GDP ratio on the one hand and the explanatory variables on the other, one has to make sure that the variables are cointegrated. As explained earlier, the error correction terms ( ) issued from the estimated error correction form of the MGE are used for this purpose. The variables are connected via a cointegrating vector in the event that the error correction term is statistically signi cant and has a negative sign. According to the results shown in Table 2 below, most of the error correction terms ful ll this double criterion. A notable exception is the panel composed of the three Baltic countries,
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Argentina (AR), Brazil (BR), Chile (CL), India (IN), Indonesia (ID), Israel (IL), Mexico (MX), Peru (PE), the Philippines (PH), South Africa (ZA), South Korea (KR), Thailand (TH). Although South Korea and Mexico are OECD countries, they can be viewed as catching-up emerging market economies for most of the period investigated in this paper.
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Austria (AT), Australia (AU), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), the Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NO), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES) and Sweden (SE).
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Germany (DE), France (FR), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US).
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The dataset is unbalanced, as the length of the individual data series depends largely on data availability. All data are transformed into logs. See Appendix A for a detailed description of the source and the time span for variables.
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These results are not reported in the paper but are available from the authors upon request.
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as there seems to be only one cointegration relationship out of the eight tested equations. EM is the panel including emerging market economies.
.
We can now turn to the coef cient estimates, which are displayed in Table 3 and in the Appendix C. GDP per capita enters the long-run relationship with the expected positive sign for the OECD and the emerging market panels. This result is particularly robust for small OECD and emerging market economies, with the size of the coef cient usually lying somewhere between 0.4 and 1.0 for most of the alternative speci cations. However, less robustness is found for the transition countries. This holds especially true for the CEE-5, for which GDP per capita turns out to be insigni cant both in the baseline and in alternative speci cations. Although cointegration could not be rmly established for the Baltic countries, it is worth mentioning that GDP per capita is usually statistically signi cant for this group as well as for the SEE-3. The fact that the coef cients' size largely exceeds unity re ects the upward bias due to quick adjustment toward equilibrium. The results furthermore indicate that the bias is substantially larger for the Baltic countries than for the SEE-3.
With regard to credit to the public sector, the estimations provide us with some interesting insights, as an increase (decrease) in credit to the public sector is found to cause a decline (rise) in private credit. This result is very robust for emerging market economies and for the CEE-5, as the coef cient estimates are almost always negative and statistically signi cant across different speci cations. This lends support to the crowding-out/crowding-in hypothesis in these countries.
Some empirical support for this hypothesis can be also established for the advanced OECD and for emerging market economies. By contrast, the estimated coef cients are either not signi cant or have a positive sign for the Baltic countries and for the SEE-3. This nding potentially mirrors the very low levels of public indebtedness of the three Baltic countries.
Let us now take a closer look at the nominal interest rate and at the in ation rate. In accordance with the results shown in Table 3 and in the Appendix C, there is reasonably robust empirical support for nominal lending rates being negatively linked to private credit in the CEE-5 as well as in emerging markets and small OECD countries. In contrast, the nding for the Baltic States and the SEE-3 is that interest rates mostly have a positive sign if they turn out to be statistically signi cant. Note that these results are not really affected by the use of lending rates or short-term interest rates.
For emerging economies from Asia and the Americas, particularly strong negative relationships are detected between the rate of in ation and private credit. Although less stable across different speci cations and estimation methods, this negative relationship between in ation and credit is also supported by the data for the CEE-5 and for small OECD economies. By contrast, no systematic pattern could be revealed for the Baltic and Southeastern European countries.
An increase in nancial liberalization, measured by a decline in spread, has the expected positive impact on private credit in small OECD economies and in the CEE-5, and also to some extent in the other transition economies. By contrast, the results for the nancial liberalization index are less robust. Although the nancial liberalization index is positively associated with private credit in OECD and emerging economies, it has an unexpected negative sign for all transition economies.
An explanation for this may be the delay with which nancial liberalization measured by this index is transmitted to private credit, whereas the spread variable captures the effective result of nancial liberalization. The same mismatch between OECD and transition economies can be seen 21 for private and public credit registries. While changes in credit registries produce the expected effect on private credit in OECD countries, the estimation results show the opposite happening in the transition economies. (Table 4) . For transition economies, even though the results are somewhat more encouraging, as the coef cient is always positively signed if it is found to be statistically signi cant, the estimated equations seem to be rather fragile in general. Small OECD economies at the 10%, 5% and 1% signi cance levels, respectively. Now, if we look at the group of countries with large increases in house prices, it turns out that house prices are positively correlated in a robust fashion with private credit, and that the other coef cient estimates are also in line with our earlier ndings. However, the fact that the inclusion of house prices yields robust results only if large increases have taken place on the property markets might suggest that house prices mostly matter for private credit in the event of a possible housing market bubble.
Deviations from the Estimated Equilibrium Levels
We now turn to the comparison of the tted values from the panel estimations for the transition economies to the observed values for the transition economies. This exercise makes it possible to see how far away the observed private credit-to-GDP ratio is from the estimated long-term value.
As both the estimated long-run coef cients and the constant terms might be biased because of the possibility of a large initial undershooting followed by a steady adjustment toward equilibrium in transition economies, which is partly con rmed in Table 3 , we are cautious about the use of in-sample panel estimates, i.e. about using the coef cient estimates obtained for the transition panels. However, more importantly, it is the lack of robustness of the coef cient estimates for the transition economies that prevents us from relying on the in-sample panel estimations. As Tables   3 and 4 and in the Appendix C show, there is no single equation for transition economies in which all coef cients are statistically signi cant and have the expected sign.
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To overcome this problem, we could apply the out-of sample analysis, using two groups of countries, namely emerging market economies and OECD countries. Emerging market economies might be expected to provide a natural benchmark for CEE economies. However, the fact that some of the coef cient estimates for this panel are not signi cant or, importantly, have the wrong sign these countries cannot be used as a benchmark. Therefore, we have experimented with a smaller panel including only small emerging markets (Chile, Israel, Peru and South Africa) which could constitute a more meaningful benchmark, given the comparability of size and GDP per capita.
Yet the coef cient estimates (not reported here) do not improve as the coef cients on credit to the government, the interest rate and the spread variable are either insigni cant or have the wrong sign.
As a result, we are left with the OECD panels. The baseline speci cation estimated by means of xed effect OLS for small open OECD economies 22 appears to be best suited, as this is the only equation where all coef cients bear the right sign and all but one are statistically signi cant (marked in green in Table 3 ).
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When engaging in an out-of-sample exercise, i.e. using the coef cient estimates obtained for the small open OECD panel to derive the tted value for transition economies, the underlying assumption is that in the long run there is parameter homogeneity between the small developed OECD panel and the transition countries. One might reasonably assume that in the long run (after adjustment toward equilibrium is completed) the behavior of transition economies will be similar to the present behavior of small OECD countries. Even though this homogeneity is ful lled between the two samples, the estimated long-run values of the private credit-to-GDP ratio and the underlying deviation from equilibrium should be interpreted from a long-run perspective.
Given that no country-speci c constant terms are available for the transition economies, the next intricate issue is how constant terms should be applied to derive the tted values. 24 Our safest bet
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Small OECD countries appear to be a reasonably useful benchmark, at least with respect to longer-term equilibrium levels. It should be noted that CEE countries have undergone a substantial convergence to small OECD countries in structural and institutional terms. As a consequence, four of these countries -the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia -joined the OECD in the second half of the 1990s. Likewise, the EBRD transition indicators (see EBRD 2005) , the standard reference point for gauging progress with the structural and institutional change in CEE countries, show that the countries under review in this study, in particular the Central European and Baltic countries, plus Croatia, have made substantial progress towards fully-edged market economies already in the second half of the 1990s, while gradually advancing further in more recent years.
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Given that this relationship may have undergone some changes over time, we carried out estimations for the following subperiods : 1980-2004; 1985-2004 and 1990-2004 . The coef cients do not change much both in terms of size and signi cance with the exception of the spread variable which becomes insigni cant for 1985-2004 and for 1990-2004 . Therefore, the estimation obtained for the whole period seems reasonably stable and thus suitable for proceeding further with the analysis. We also carried out estimations for a panel composed of catching-up EU countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain). However, the results (not reported here) appear to be not very robust.
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Note that Cottarelli et al. (2005) , the rst paper which derives the equilibrium level of private credit for transition economies, does not address the issue of the constant terms.
is to use the largest and the smallest constant terms (as well as the median constant term) obtained on the basis of the small OECD panel, which gives us the whole spectrum of possible estimated values for private credit.
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The derived range of deviation is plotted on Chart 4. The error margin is, however, rather large. Consequently, if one considers midpoints, Croatia is now the only country which might have reached equilibrium by 2004. When looking at whole ranges, other countries, namely Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia, might have already reached equilibrium as well, while the mass of the estimated deviation was still located mostly on the undershooting side in 2004. At the same time, the upper edges of the estimated band come close to equilibrium for Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland and Slovenia. Moreover, it turns out that the initial overshooting might not have been that large for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, after all. Finally, it is interesting to see that the initial undershooting remains relatively stable for Lithuania, Poland and Romania throughout the period.
Another reason for selecting the baseline speci cation is that the variables included are all expressed in levels, which ensures that the constant terms derived on this basis have a cross-sectional meaning. For instance, the constants would not have any cross-sectional meaning if indices with a base year were used (e.g. for industrial production or house prices).
Chart 4. Deviations from Long-Run Equilibrium Credit-to- GDP, 1990 GDP, to 2004 Baltic Countries 1991q1 1992q2 1993q3 1994q4 1996q1 1997q2 1998q3 1999q4 2001q1 2002q2 2003q3 2004q4 Note: negative values indicate that the observed private credit to GDP ratio is lower than what a particular country's GDP per capita would predict ("undervaluation") Conversely, positive gures show an "overvaluation" of the private credit to GDP ratio.
One explanation for the initial undershooting observed for the countries under study is the low share of credit to households in total domestic credit. Chart 5 hereafter shows the importance of credit to households was substantially lower in transition economies than in the euro area in 1999.
Nevertheless, a relative increase in credit to households can be observed over the last 7 years or so, in particular in countries where an adjustment towards equilibrium is shown on chart 4. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the equilibrium level of private credit to GDP in 11 transition economies from CEE on the basis of a number of dynamic panels containing quarterly data for transition economies, developed OECD economies and emerging markets, and relying on a framework including both factors that capture the demand for and the supply of private credit.
Credit to the public sector (crowding out/crowding in), nominal interest rates, the in ation rate and the spread between lending and deposit rates aimed at capturing nancial liberalization and competition in the banking sector turn out to be the major determinants of credit growth in the CEE-5, while GDP per capita is the only variable that enters the estimated equations in a robust manner for the Baltic and Southeastern European countries. Furthermore, we nd the estimated coef cients for transition economies are much higher than those obtained for OECD and emerging market economies, which testi es to the bias caused by the initial undershooting of private credit to GDP in most countries. Another interesting result is that house prices are found to lead to an increase in private credit only in countries with high house price in ation. This nding disquali es the house price variable from being included in the long-run equation to be used for the derivation of the equilibrium level of private credit.
We have emphasized that relying on in-sample panel estimates of the equilibrium level of private credit for transition economies is problematic not only because of the possible bias which shows up in the estimated coef cients due to the initial undershooting, but also because the equations estimated for transition economies are not suf ciently stable. To overcome these problems, we used small open OECD countries as a benchmark to derive the equilibrium level of private credit for transition economies as our intention to use the emerging markets panel as the benchmark was thwarted by the lack of robustness of the empirical results. Another reason for using the small OECD panel as a benchmark is the following. Transition economies are expected to converge in behavior to this panel in the longer run. Hence, such a panel provides us with coef cient estimates that can be used to infer equilibrium credit-to-GDP ratios which apply in the long run for transition economies.
We can draw some general conclusions with regard to undershooting and overshooting for tran- Finally, it is interesting to see that the initial undershooting remains relatively stable for Lithuania, Poland and Romania throughout the period. Overall, our results suggest that the CEE countries cannot be generally regarded as (over)shooting stars in terms of their credit-to-GDP ratios despite robust credit growth observed in most of the countries. However, Croatia seems to outcompete the other countries in the pursuit of the title of an (over)shooting star, albeit Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia are still trying hard to ght back.
The prospects for the future are that credit growth will very likely remain rapid in CEE or to accelerate further in those countries where it is still comparatively moderate, given that the underlying factors which support private sector credit dynamics will remain at work for some time to come. As experience shows, the rapid pace of credit expansion and its persistence in a number of countries does by itself pose the risk of a deterioration of asset quality. Moreover, it exposes lenders and borrowers to risks because of an increase in unhedged foreign currency lending. Furthermore, the rapid adjustment process toward equilibrium levels may trigger demand booms, causing current account de cits to move above levels that can be sustained over a longer period of time. However, we leave it to future research to determine empirically the optimal speed of adjustment toward equilibrium that does not jeopardize macroeconomic and nancial stability. Lending rates are based on bank lending rates, and wherever not available, long-term government bond yields are used instead. Three-month treasury bill rates, and wherever not available, money market rates, are employed for short-term interest rates. The spread is calculated using lending (or, wherever not available, long-term government bond yields) and deposit rates. : 1975 :q1-2004 Emerging markets: 1975 :q1-2004 :q4 except for ARG: 1982 :q3 (1983 BR: 1988 BR: :q3 (1989 ; INDO: 1980:q3; PE: 1984 PE: :q1 (1985 ; TK: 1990 TK: :q1 (1987 Transition economies: HU, PL: 1990:Q4; BG, EE, SI: 1991:q4; LT: 1993:q1; LV: 1993:q3; CZ, SK: 1993:q4; HR: 1993 HR: :q4 (1994 ; EE: 1991; RO: 1996:q4.
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